In regard to Ukraine, first of all, it is semantic and contextual differentiation. Conceptually, Intermarium, Trimarium, their ideological & practical difference in the frame of public perception is hardly distinguishable. In addition, a similar effect in perception is observed even within the state establishment. Historical narratives, lack of proper informational support, unified strategy absence, polar vectors of foreign policy interests among decision-makers are the issues which mentally alienate Ukraine from the goal of effective cooperation.
In regard to Ukraine, first of all, it is semantic and contextual differentiation. Conceptually, Intermarium, Trimarium, their ideological & practical difference in the frame of public perception is hardly distinguishable. In addition, a similar effect in perception is observed even within the state establishment. Historical narratives, lack of proper informational support, unified strategy absence, polar vectors of foreign policy interests among decision-makers are the issues which mentally alienate Ukraine from the goal of effective cooperation.
Considering the war with the Russian Federation, propaganda, ideological "rollback" from democratic values observed in Ukraine since 2019, we are once again facing a civilizational choice, but currently articulated desire is not enough.
This report concerns specifically Three Seas Initiative, and in this axis in 2020, positive changes have occurred for Ukraine. Referring to both the intrasystemic representation of the idea, which is now enshrined in parliament, at the level of the President, and foreign policy - about the prospects of Ukraine as an observer country.
The key question "what's next" should be evaluated from a realistic perspective, leaving constructivism and idealism behind. It is necessary to realize that the Trimarium initiative in a modern format is a self-help project with a focus on energy, transport and infrastructure digitalization. Despite the obvious regional strengthening which TSI potentially may bring in the scope of defense and subjectiveness, there is no reason for Ukraine to expect “911 effect” or instant aid from neighbors ”. The BABS countries need Ukraine in the vector of containment of the Kremlin's aggression, but full membership in the initiative is out of the question due to the fact that Ukraine is not part of the EU.
This is true, but not quite. The key issue is also the fact that, unlike the member countries that have passed Public Administration, New Public Management, and now participate in 76 TSI projects, most of which are based on Post-New Public Management and Supranational Governance, Ukraine is stuck in transit between bureaucracy and PA, there is practically nothing to offer in terms of efficiency and reliability.
Failed anti-corruption and tax reforms, decentralization that has increased the level of corruption, energy monopolies and the digitalization of infrastructure that requires up to 100 billion investments - this is not about competitiveness.
Ukraine is considered as a partner in 4 out of 28 new TSI projects. The new project fund provides grounds for the implementation of the planned projects, but Ukraine is not a participant and it would be a mistake to expect fundamental changes in the nearest future.
What lesson can we learn here ?
For Ukraine to expand own role strategically, there are several options existing,
for instance:
• Main Reform agenda lines in region have to converge.
• There should be a proper institutional environment (gradual change
including layering).
• Leadership instead of management.
• There should be Coercive, Mimetic and Normative isomorphism.
If so, there will definitely appear a policy window to integrate Ukraine deeper, providing association facilities further, however at current times our state participation remains restricted and limited until the “homework” is done.